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Chasing Justice: Victim engagement with accountability for human rights 
abuses in North Korea 
 
Sarah A. Son 
University of Sheffield 
 
Abstract 
This article considers the question of accountability for human rights abuses alleged to have 
been committed in North Korea, via a possible future process of transitional justice. It focuses 
on the efforts of South Korean nongovernmental organisations that have worked for over two 
decades to document reported abuses and, more recently, to consider how perpetrators of those 
abuses may be held accountable. While noting the significance of this work, the article draws 
on research focused on the efficacy of transitional justice from the victim perspective, to learn 
more about how those who may identify as victims of the North Korean regime perceive the 
possible methods for redress and both individual and collective recovery from abuses. The 
article engages with some preliminary research done with self-identifying victims of the North 
Korean regime and assesses some of the weaknesses in current South Korean civil society 
practice involving North Korean escapees. It highlights challenges to pursuing an alternative 
approach that places victims at the centre and provides some recommendations for how NGOs 
might develop and pilot new approaches to planning for and implementing a transitional justice 
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Introduction 
Since the mid-1990s, human rights organisations in South Korea and abroad have worked 
diligently to raise awareness about the abuses taking place in the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (North Korea). In 2014, a report by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on 
human rights in North Korea (UN COI) called for practical approaches for dealing with alleged 
crimes against humanity, through a greater focus on accountability. Specifically, the report’s 
recommendation that members of the North Korean leadership, including Kim Jong Un, be 
referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC), drew global attention. The UN COI (2014, 
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p. 369) also called for the launch of “a people-driven process to establish the truth about the 
violations”, while one of the commissioners, Marzuki Darusmann, told a Seoul press 
conference, “It is now time to consider the concrete measures that should be taken to ensure 
accountability for those crimes and to set up a broader process of transitional justice” (UN 
OHCHR, 2015). 
 
This article considers the subsequent effort within South Korean and international human rights 
organisations to address the question of accountability for human rights abuses in North Korea, 
potentially through some form of transitional justice process in the future. Transitional justice 
is defined as a set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of 
conflict or repression, aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law (Roht–Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006, p. 2). While noting the 
important work that has been done to explore what accountability via top-down, legal 
mechanisms might mean in a North Korea transitioning away from authoritarianism, this article 
draws on research focused on the efficacy of transitional justice from the victim perspective. 
Specifically, it assesses the aims and outcomes of engagement with the population of North 
Korean escapees in South Korea as it relates to the pursuit of accountability.  
 
The UN COI inspired more concerted efforts on human rights record-creation and 
accountability strategy formation than had existed in the past. Developments included 
increased focus given to North Korean human rights on the agendas of various UN bodies; the 
establishment of a United Nations human rights office in Seoul; South Korea’s passing of a 
North Korean human rights act; and sustained advocacy by NGOs. Furthermore, although not 
an entirely new concept in the Korean context (Hong, 2010), the range of scholarship on 
transitional justice has broadened as a result of the COI’s recommendations (Baek & Lee, 2017; 
Baek & Teitel, 2015; Cho, 2014; Hong, 2017; H. J. Kim, 2017; Kim, Cho & Baek, 2014). The 
grounds for much of this commentary is a view of North Korean human rights abuses through 
a legal lens, focussed on the position of “humanity” as a constituency of international criminal 
justice, not just the North Koreans who have experienced first-hand abuses by the state. The 
atrocities against which international criminal justice is directed are thus seen as “global 
crimes”, collectivised in their impact and therefore of concern to all humanity (Findlay, 2009, 
p. 190). 
 
These developments also prompted human rights groups in South Korea to begin thinking 
about their documentation work beyond the collection and publication of escapee testimonies 
for awareness-raising, towards altering their data collection methods to amass the type of data 
that could support a future criminal justice process (Son, Bielefeld, Oh, Stevens, & Lee, 2017). 
Consequently, over the past several years, the UN human rights office in Seoul and other 
organisations have brought legal experts to South Korea to assess documentation practices and 
provide guidance to improve the quality of what is stored. Most recently, UN Human Rights 
Council resolution 34/24 mandated the Seoul UN human rights office to “establish a central 
information and evidence repository; and have experts in criminal justice assess all information 
and testimonies with a view to developing possible strategies to be used in any future 
accountability process” (Human Rights Council, 2019, para. 10).  
 
Yet the scope of transitional justice is not limited to criminal justice. It involves different 
mechanisms designed to address the multifaceted aspects of individual and collective recovery 
from conflict or oppression. These mechanisms may include truth-seeking initiatives, 
memorialisation and educational programmes, financial reparations, and other grassroots and 
government-led activities to support the recovery of victims, institutionalise peace and 
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democracy and re-build society. Whether a fundamental transition occurs in North Korea via 
unification with the South or independently, a range of locally embedded social dynamics will 
shape institutional processes for investigating North Korea’s history and forming a vision for 
the future that defines new parameters of national belonging. The experience of grave human 
rights abuses will be a crucial part of the North Korean people’s identity, demanding 
comprehensive, transformational redress. Yet in the flurry of academic and civil society 
discourse that arose on transitional justice following the COI, the agency of abuse survivors in 
planning for future mechanisms of redress has been largely overlooked. 
 
This article draws on research on the efficacy of transitional justice from the victim perspective 
to evaluate current efforts to pursue accountability and means of engagement with victim 
constituencies. It begins by highlighting contributions from the global scholarship and 
practitioner guidance on victim participation in designing and leading transitional justice 
processes. It then considers how organisations working on this issue have engaged with former 
residents of North Korea to support the push for accountability. The article assesses some of 
the weaknesses in current practice involving victims of the North Korean state’s excesses, 
before drawing on data I and other organisations gathered from North Korean escapees1 to 
better understand what stakeholders pursuing “localised” or “bottom-up” transitional justice 
should consider in this context. The article then provides some recommendations for how 
NGOs might develop and pilot new approaches to planning for a transitional justice process 
for North Korea when the opportunity arises. This research also aims to contribute to the 
relatively understudied question of NGO engagement in transitional justice processes (Gready 
& Robins, 2017, p. 956). It considers the NGO landscape in South Korea from my perspective 
having worked inside an organisation specifically on North Korean human rights issues while 
engaging with a number of external organisations focused on accountability mechanisms.2 
 
Transitional Justice for North Korea 
Given the existence of various forms of oppression and mass atrocity in many parts of the 
world, an abundance of precedent-giving examples exists to help imagine how transitional 
justice might be applied to the situation in North Korea. Burgeoning knowledge about 
distinctions between the remedies best suited to “paradigmatic” (liberal democracy building) 
and “non-paradigmatic” (post-conflict, peacebuilding) transitions (Sharp, 2015), provides 
guidance for governments, civil society and international stakeholders to tailor approaches to 
helping newly transitioning nations recover. In addition, precedent also exists where 
transitional justice mechanisms have been set in motion before an actual transition has taken 
place, as in Columbia in 2011 (Summers, 2012). For its part, South Korea is no stranger to 
transitional justice mechanisms, having run, albeit unsatisfactorily in some respects, a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in the mid-2000s.3  
 
Civil society groups often play key roles in establishing and supporting transitional justice 
processes: the church and human rights NGOs in both Chile and Guatemala played a pivotal 
role in gathering evidence of abuses while violence there was ongoing (Rothenberg, 2012). 
NGOs including the Documentation Center for Cambodia worked tirelessly to bring about the 
establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia in 2003, to prosecute 
the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime over two decades after it was ousted from power. NGOs 
in the Philippines are working now to gather evidence and lobby internationally to hold 
President Rodrigo Duterte accountable when possible for the many civilian killings that have 
resulted from his so-called “war on drugs”. As a result, despite its relatively short history as a 
field of research and practice, and notwithstanding questions about its long-term efficacy (Kim 
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& Sikkink, 2012; McCargo, 2015), transitional justice offers much to ponder when it comes to 
thinking about how to approach the long-running situation in North Korea. 
 
Scholars have noted a variety of important considerations in the recent research on transitional 
justice for North Korea, including the impact of the type of transition that could unfold; the 
challenge of defining the scope of human rights abuses and the limits on who might face 
prosecution; the problem of building national consensus for transitional justice; and the many 
competing logistical priorities associated with re-building a nation-state (Baek & Teitel, 2015; 
Burt, 2017; Hong, 2010). In addition to these concerns, Baek, Collins and Kim issue an 
accurate warning regarding the complications presented by, “the history of the (inter-Korean) 
division and competing ideologies between the two Koreas... (and) persisting social conflict” 
(Baek et. al., 2015, p. 238), which could cripple a recovery process. As important as these 
observations are, a weakness in the existing analysis has been a tendency to focus on the top-
down implementation of mechanisms by a new national government or by international actors. 
Moreover, although the literature notes the need for a victim-centred perspective of transitional 
justice (Baek, Collins & Kim, 2015, p. 236; Burt, 2017, p. 8) there is little meaningful 
discussion around what this would look like in practice. 
 
The efforts of organisations working on North Korean human rights abuses have mirrored this 
emphasis on top-down, elite-driven mechanisms. Work has been channelled towards gathering 
incident data from former residents of North Korea in the hope this data might be used to form 
legal cases against perpetrators. The activities of NGOs in South Korea working alongside the 
UN can be seen as in line with the common practice worldwide of “responding to gross 
violations through a predominantly legal lens, developing victims for collecting victim and 
witness testimony”, while paying less attention to the broader impact on and needs of affected 
communities (Robins & Wilson, 2015, p. 224). Critics of the dominance of legalism in 
transitional justice argue that this can lead to knowledge production “in a limited fashion on 
others’ terms” (Robins & Wilson, 2015, p. 224). As helpful as progress in evidence-gathering 
and legal analysis has been in a practical sense, criminal justice is only “a symbolic first stage 
in addressing more restorative and community-centred considerations” (Findlay, 2009, p. 193). 
Despite working with many survivors of the North Korean regime’s abuses on a daily basis, 
concerned organisations have yet to consider thoroughly what it actually means to pursue a 
victim-centred approach to preparations for a transitional justice process, in terms of how such 
an approach might re-shape research methods, the design of outreach programmes, and 
engagement of victims’ groups. 
 
What is a victim-centred approach? 
The popular claim of transitional justice to be ‘victim centred’ has come under intense scrutiny 
in recent years, as debate around the duty of states responding to gross human rights violations 
has shifted from the duty to prosecute to a more integrated approach (Kamatali, 2007, p. 275). 
This has resulted from the problematisation of “top down” transitional justice, which has led 
to an increased scepticism about some of the grander claims regarding victim empowerment 
(Findlay, 2009; McEvoy & McConnachie, 2012, p. 527). McEvoy and McConnachie argue:  
... despite the rhetoric, victims are (to varying degrees) instrumentalised in 
the pursuit of larger political and social goals such as reinforcing the rule of 
law, deterring future offenders, getting to the “truth” of past violence and, 




Scholars note a distinction between retributive justice, which constructs victims as “passive 
objects” and restorative justice, which constructs them as “active agents” (Garbett, 2016, p. 42). 
Yet this does not mean that victim participation in the latter context is truly “active”. Rather, 
victims are often deployed as part of the self-legitimation of transitional justice, rather than as 
true agents, empowered to shape the process (McEvoy & McConnachie, 2013, p. 490). This is 
because transitional justice processes are most often “created by elites... and supported by an 
international community remote from the context and from indigenous understandings” 
(Robins, 2011, p. 76). Why does this matter, and what is lost from a process that is not 
adequately victim-centred? 
 
Research from a number of settings notes that victims in many contexts “know little of rights 
and instead articulate needs” (Robins, 2011, p. 77). The privileging of an externally imposed 
discourse around transitional justice can leave urgent needs unmet, by prioritising civil and 
political rights over social, economic and cultural rights (Robins, 2011, p. 78). In addition, the 
re-traumatisation, or the failure to achieve any so-called “therapeutic effect”, are consequences 
associated with truth-telling or criminal justice processes that have been imposed without due 
care for victim priorities (Robins, 2012). Elite-driven processes can also lead to victim 
frustration for failing to deliver on promises, to meet the inherent diversity of needs present in 
the victim experience, or when processes place a disproportionate focus on legitimising the 
liberal state (Robins, 2017, pp. 43–44). Moreover, as Doak (2011, p. 11) demonstrates, there 
are important distinctions between the healing of the individual and that of wider society, 
necessitating different approaches to address individual and collective experiences. 
 
Two solutions emerge from recent literature critiquing the failure to achieve an effective level 
of victim-centred-ness in transitional justice processes: developing an understanding of victim 
constituencies, alongside the empowerment of these constituencies to participate actively and 
with determining powers in the design and implementation of a transitional justice process. 
Robins (2011, p. 76) writes: 
To privilege a victim perspective, studies are required that engage with 
those who have experienced violations, understanding the meaning the 
populations give to such events and the symbolic and social worlds they 
occupy. To root a response to gross violations in the experience of those 
most affected demands an empirical and an ethnographic approach.  
 
The burgeoning research on victim engagement and empowerment in planning for transitional 
justice measures cites many advantages to be gained from this approach, distinguishing between 
“rights” versus “needs” of victims, where the latter are “a product of culture and context and 
are highly local in nature” (Robins, 2011, p. 77). In what follows, I look at different aspects of 
primarily civil society, but also to some extent South Korean government and international (UN) 
engagement with North Koreans, as part of efforts to pursue an accountability-oriented agenda. 
Insights gained through several years working in a human rights NGO in Seoul, alongside data 
gathered over this time directly from the escapee community, are then used to evaluate current 
practices, with a view to looking at ways they could be improved to get closer to more victim-
centred approaches. 
 
Current victim engagement practices 
NGOs in South Korea focussed on North Korean human rights issues have shown greater 
determination than the South Korean government in working closely with the North Korean 
escapee community and using the information gathered from them to push for accountability 
for the North Korean regime. This was particularly evident after the passing of the North Korean 
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human rights act in 2016 by the South Korean National Assembly, when the provisions of the 
act either barely stuttered into action or never materialised at all. This was largely thanks to lack 
of institutional provision and a new government in 2017, which de-emphasised North Korean 
human rights issues in the interests of inter-Korean engagement. The 2016 act established a 
government-run Center for North Korean Human Rights Records under the Ministry of 
Unification (MOU); however, despite engaging in some data gathering, it is yet to publish any 
findings publicly (Cho, 2019). NGOs, by contrast, have a proven track-record of data-gathering 
on a wide range of themes for public dissemination and engagement with external institutions. 
These organisations have gathered data and reported on an increasingly diverse range of issues 
over the past two decades, including child rights, women’s issues, overseas workers, the justice 
system, freedom of expression, health and food insecurity, and state-led cyber-attacks, among 
other themes (Gang & Hosaniak, 2018; Jun, LaFoy & Sohn, 2015; Lee, 2009; Park, 2016). 
 
Beyond research and reporting, some human rights NGOs also run English-language lessons 
for escapees, summer camps for youth, counselling services and education and training 
opportunities to help equip North Koreans for life in South Korea. Drawing on years of 
experience working with escapees, a number of groups worked effectively in consortium to 
lobby for the establishment of the UN COI and cooperated with the Commissioners to supply 
valuable data and witnesses. They have since partnered with the UN human rights office in 
Seoul and with other organisations to share information, inform UN procedures, cooperatively 
gather evidence and continue their other support activities for North Koreans. 
 
It is worth noting that most of this work is led by South Koreans, not escapees themselves. The 
North Korean human rights movement began in the mid-1990s, shortly after South Korea’s 
democratisation, at a time when there were very few North Koreans in the South at all. Most 
organisations were therefore founded by South Koreans, who have maintained the much of the 
leadership since. Moreover, their activities, while certainly impactful in many respects, are 
largely typical of what Gready and Robins (2017, p. 962) term “old civil society”, whereby 
interactions between civil society and transitional justice (or in the Korean case, preliminary 
work to support a future transitional justice process) are conceived “through the prism of 
institutional mechanisms, rather than seeing transitional justice as a set of discourses and a form 
of politics”. The current methods of NGO engagement with the accountability agenda are 
focussed primarily on transnational advocacy and global human rights “norm diffusion”. Tsai 
and Robins (2018, p. 33) write:  
This is... underpinned by coalitions between national and external actors, and the 
understanding that local actors... when faced with a hostile, unresponsive state, look 
outwards to supportive NGOs, states, inter-governmental agencies and other actors 
for support and to put pressure on the state. Among the criticisms of transnational 
advocacy are that it... privileges elite advocacy, external allies and norms, reflecting 
a top-down theory of change.  
 
The result is a limit on independent action and research that adequately localises or 
contextualises understandings of responses to human rights abuses, as well as limited creation 
of spaces where alternative approaches to this field of work can be developed and tested 
(Gready & Robins, 2017, p. 962). 
 
As a result, the empowerment aspect has been relatively neglected in terms of engagement with 
those victims of human rights abuses currently in the South. While North Korean escapees are 
invited to take part in NGO and government-run activities focussed on expediting and 
supporting their adjustment to life as South Korean citizens, there is little thought around an 
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active role for them in preparing for a transition in North Korea. NGOs also struggle to secure 
meaningful representation within their staff as a whole from the North Korean escapee 
community due to lack of interest, limited resources, lack of essential skills and training, as 
well as escapee fear of bringing harm on family members still residing in North Korea. While 
some North Koreans do travel to give testimonies abroad, a tendency has developed to conduct 
inter-organisational meetings with international organisations in Seoul and abroad in English, 
and to employ and send English-speaking members of staff to meetings, trainings, and 
advocacy activities. 
 
In sum, although North Korean human rights NGOs in South Korea have made great inroads 
in gathering the data that has supported the turn towards pursuing accountability for human 
rights abuses and mobilised greater attention to the problem than in the past, there are evidently 
a number of barriers to the potential for victims to help initiate, or to assist in the design and 
implementation of a transitional justice process for North Korea. As a result, the treatment 
experienced by North Koreans in South Korea emulates the critique levelled by McEvoy about 
transitional justice institutions tending “to see victims or violence-affected communities as 
constituencies which must be managed rather than citizens to whom they must be accountable” 
(McEvoy, 2007, p. 424). At their worst, these practices may also be susceptible to the strong 
critique levelled by Madlingozi (2010) and others, who see human rights “professionals” 
claiming to act on behalf of victims as “transitional justice entrepreneurs”, “stealing the pain 
of others” by speaking for them, in what could be interpreted as “an act of further violence and 
dispossession” (Alcoff, 1991; Madlingozi, 2010, pp. 208–11; Razack, 2007). 
 
Engaging the victim constituency 
Moving beyond the established modes of engagement described above requires new forms of 
inquiry and action with those who have come from North Korea. At this time, little research 
has been conducted into manifestations of victimhood within the North Korean escapee 
community, particularly as it may shape their thoughts regarding future remedies for North 
Korean society. Arguably, such questions are not a high priority while the inter-Korean division 
persists and regime change or opening in North Korea appears a remote possibility. However, 
tailoring transitional justice mechanisms and processes that support the priorities of those most 
affected requires gathering evidence that paints as accurate a picture as possible of the 
conditions of the local context (Pham & Vinck, 2007). If such work can be initiated or piloted 
ahead of time in the Korean context, it may support swifter implementation of targeted 
consultations in the future. Existing research in this field globally provides valuable guidelines 
for organisations wishing to gain a better understanding of the needs of local communities, as 
well as victim perceptions of transitional justice (Levin, 2011; “The Day After”, 2014; Vinck, 
Pham, Baldo, & Shigekane, 2006; Williams, Bernath, Boravin, & Kum, 2018). 4 In this section, 
I look at some preliminary steps taken via survey questionnaires and interviews with North 
Korean escapees to gain an understanding of North Korean escapee perceptions of victimhood 
regarding human rights abuses, alongside possible remedies. 
 
Methodological considerations 
Methodologically, working with a community of escapees, as opposed to being able to access 
the resident population in North Korea directly, does raise some issues of representation. Over 
75 per cent of North Koreans settled in South Korea are from two northern provinces, 
Ryanggang and North Hamgyeong, which account for only 12 per cent of the North Korean 
population (Song & Denney, 2019, p. 453). Additionally, the proportion of female escapees in 
the South is 72 per cent at present (Ministry of Unification, 2019). There are also challenges to 
getting access to North Korean escapees by means other than referral from existing contacts, 
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as the government restricts access to newly arrived escapees to only a few organisations until 
they are released from the secure settlement centre (Hanawon). Additionally, many North 
Korean escapees report feeling suspicious of one another, due to social relationships and forms 
of social control from North Korea being “transplanted” to the escapee community in the South 
(Song & Bell, 2019, p. 166). Perhaps, therefore, aside from certain churches and small 
alternative schools for escapee youth, there are limited organised escapee social groups that 
NGOs might access to reach out to potential participants for research or other activities. In 
order to secure research participation, organisations often pay a financial reward of between 
$30 and $300 to interviewees, designed to compensate for the cost of travel and the 
inconvenience of perhaps having to miss work shifts.1 Yet some observers note this could 
provide “a perverse incentive to exaggerate (and possibly fabricate) information” (Song & 
Denney, 2019, p. 453). The expectation of payment also presents an additional barrier to access 
for organisations that cannot or will not pay for information. 
 
Even though research conducted within the escapee community must come with the important 
caveat that findings cannot be considered representative of the experiences and opinions of the 
North Korean population as a whole (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 7), the long-running and varied 
work done by many organisations with this community has established both survey and 
interview work as valid tools of inquiry into the experiences and views of the North Korean 
escapee population (Han, 2018; B.Y. Kim, 2017; Kretchun & Kim, 2012). Moreover, Song and 
Denney (2019, p. 453) note that “empowering the voices of those who, because of their former 
positions in the DPRK, can speak with some authority is just and warranted” . It was on this 
basis that I conducted a minor survey of North Korean escapees who were concurrently 
participating in human rights monitoring work at the Transitional Justice Working Group in 
Seoul. This was done using a questionnaire administered to 450 people between 2015 and 2019. 
In mid-2018, in-depth interviews were conducted with 10 people,5  focussed on issues of 
victimhood, transitional justice and potential remedies for human rights abuses in a 
transitioning North Korea (see Appendix).6 The full findings of this survey are published in 
report form elsewhere (Son, 2019), but I have incorporated selected findings below. 
 
Victimisation and victimhood 
Defining “victim” as a category attached to harm is usually the first task in identifying 
transitional-justice mechanisms but doing so is far from straightforward. Social science 
research has sought to address the common question: “Why do these victims, rather than others, 
come to be recognised, by whom and for what purpose(s)?” (Jacoby, 2015, p. 512). Victimhood 
is inherently political, “a form of collective identity”, and a “complicated and contested 
phenomenon, fractured and plural and never complete” (Jacoby, 2015, pp. 513–516). There is 
a consequent need to explore the choices behind victimhood to learn more about the 
relationship between victimhood and struggles for recognition, unity and emancipation (Jacoby, 
2015, p. 513). With these considerations in mind, the research conducted with escapees found 
three themes: A high proportion of participants choosing to identify as victims; a wide variety 
of bases for this identification; and a tendency for victim identification to develop 
retrospectively. 
 
First, 84.6 per cent of respondents surveyed chose to identify themselves as “victims” of the 
North Korean regime. This was despite a smaller percentage of participants reporting personal 
experiences of physical harm (47.7 per cent), or reporting experience of what the research 
defined as “wider harm” (72.9 per cent): personal physical harm in addition to experience of 
 
1 All monetary totals refer to US$ unless otherwise specified. 
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the starvation or murder by the authorities of a family member, forced repatriation to North 
Korea, arrest or detention. This suggested that victimhood is derived from a wider range of 
factors than the experiences of physical violence or wider harm to the individual as presented 
in the questionnaire (see Table 1). 
 





To then investigate how victimhood may have been interpreted by the questionnaire 
respondents, participants in the in-depth interviews were asked to explain the source of this 
identification. For several it was grounded in a very obvious experience of abuse such as being 
sent to a political prison camp following repatriation to North Korea from China, or a serious 
physical assault by the North Korean authorities. For others it was not due to direct, personal 
violations of bodily integrity, but rather to situations such as the imprisonment of an adult son 
for attempting to escape the country, or the very existence of the inter-Korean division, which 
prevents freedom of movement to visit family remaining in North Korea. Several interviewees 
raised the North Korean social classification system, known as songbun, which divides citizens 
into “loyal”, “wavering” and “hostile” classes, and attached their victimhood to the lifelong, 
unfair treatment they experienced as a result of being of “low” songbun, “no matter how hard 
(they) worked for the system”. This system has been described as “a cruel and persistent reality 
for the millions who must experience on a daily basis” (Collins, 2012, p. 1). Low songbun is 
typically passed down the generations, as was the case for one interviewee who reported 
persistent discrimination while in North Korea on account of his father being an ethnic Korean 
who was born in China. While a certain amount is known about deeply embedded structural 
discrimination, defined and maintained by the songbun system, further research is needed into 
what extent its effects may persist following a fundamental political transformation in North 
Korea, as well as the sorts of remedies that might be applied to dismantle it and end the 
dehumanising impact it has on many. 
 
Another common theme that arose in the interviews was the retrospective nature of victim 
identification connected to rights violations. One interviewee who had suffered an unprovoked 
attack from a police officer said that at the time of the assault she had felt utterly powerless, 
and that it was only when she came to South Korea that she had realised her “importance” and 
“value”. An interviewee who had been repatriated from China stated that at the time she 
believed she had deserved to be “beaten up” by the authorities, for having “betrayed” her 
country. It was only after time interacting with human rights organisations in South Korea that 
Question Yes No Total 
Number % of total Number % of total 












Personal experience of physical violence 
perpetrated by the North Korean authorities, 











Personal experience of wider harm, 
perpetrated by the North Korean authorities, 
in North Korea (experience of physical 
violence above, plus starvation or murder of a 
close family member, forced repatriation to 






















she came to see herself as having rights that had been violated. Several of the female 
interviewees described feeling burdened by ongoing health problems resulting from physical 
harm experienced in North Korea, which have a considerable impact on daily life today. One 
male interviewee discussed his intention to join a petition of victims to the UN regarding 
political prisoners in the hope that his son might be set free from prison if sufficient 
international pressure could be applied. 
 
These indications that victim identification is something that can emerge retrospectively, and 
for varying reasons, and/or in response to specific opportunities to be heard, highlights a 
significant burden on human rights organisations, both in South Korea and abroad, to think 
carefully about defining categories of victimhood, as well as the labelling associated with this 
because: 
... the right to define a victim (and be so defined) is an equally salient form of 
power as it grants legitimacy to some groups and not others. From this act of 
labelling flows a host of material and other benefits bestowed on recognised 
victims, from which those who fail to get recognised are deprived (Jacoby, 2015, 
p. 516). 
 
Robins also cautions that identities constructed via “public recognition selection processes” 
can deny the victim active agency over their own identity (Robins, 2017, pp. 52–53). This can 
manifest when NGOs, the state and other institutional actors present themselves as “saviours” 
or “protectors” of a disempowered victim constituency (Robins, 2017, p. 53). A preferable goal 
to achieve social transformation is “that change is made by empowering victims themselves, 
rather than others acting on their behalf” (Robins, 2017, p. 55). Many North Korean escapees 
have already sought to present their own narrative of their victimisation to the world, via TED 
Talks, television appearances, or through the publication of memoirs. Several of those I 
interviewed, while describing their own sense of victimhood, expressed scepticism about the 
truth of some stories about violence and suffering told by escapees in the media, saying they 
themselves failed to connect with narratives they felt were sometimes “exaggerated”. 
 
Findlay (2009, p. 196) notes that further challenges to defining victimhood also emerge from 
the ways communities can be resistant to a focus on highlighting victimhood based on 
individually-held grievances where “individual rights are subservient to communitarian 
concerns of social harmony”. Scarlatoiu addresses this concern when he raises the potential 
impact of jeong (compassion) and chaemyon (face) on a future transitional justice process, 
which could cause a desire to avoid extended international attention for the crimes of North 
Korean perpetrators. These socio-cultural features of Korean society could impact the 
formation of national consensus around airing what could be perceived as collective “dirty 
laundry” (Scarlatoiu, 2015, p. 102). Gender-related concerns should also be noted here. 
Observers emphasise it is women under the North Korean regime who endure 
“disproportionate suffering” and who have historically been less likely to testify about 
violations experienced for fear of social discrimination, shame, or even a lack of awareness 
that an experience could be considered a violation of their rights (Burt, 2017, pp. 8–9). Recent 
efforts to address this issue have been made by several organisations reporting on 
discrimination against women in North Korea (An & Sim, 2018; Gang & Hosaniak, 2018). In 
sum, victimisation and the types of victimhood identity it can confer onto both the individual 
and affected groups are issues which need greater attention in this context, given the 
complexity of designing and applying measures that are considered effective in addressing the 
needs arising from that victimisation. 
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Proposing transitional justice remedies 
In addition to framing and defining victimhood, determining appropriate measures to formally 
address the various forms of victimisation also comes with many challenges, and typically, 
“victims are defined by their experience and its codification in law” (Robins & Wilson, 2015, 
p. 224). To date, some of the questions that have been debated in the search for remedies 
include: Where is the line between state and non-state violence drawn? Where has North Korea 
neglected its responsibility to protect? Are there grounds for genocide having been committed? 
Perpetrator categories are no less easy to define. McEvoy and McConnachie (2012) note that 
“the complex network of human relations” means that it is impossible to reduce to a binary 
description of victims and perpetrators. Rather, “the ‘innocent’ victim is placed at the apex of 
a hierarchy of victimhood and becomes a symbol around which contested notions of past 
violence and suffering are constructed and reproduced” (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012, p. 
532). Interviewees showed awareness of this challenge, stating, for example, “we should 
prosecute depending on the seriousness of the crime. Some officials did things because they 
were forced”. Additionally, transitional justice mechanisms often place disproportionate focus 
on addressing physical violence while largely excluding “victims of the structural violence of 
social and economic rights violations from its purview, understanding justice as linked almost 
exclusively to violations of bodily integrity” (Robins, 2017, p. 52). Lack of basic needs is so 
widespread that one of the first tasks for a transitioning government should be targeted 
assessment on the ground, with the input of key agencies with established knowledge of the 
North Korean resource context. Such needs should not come second to institutional 
mechanisms focussed on accountability. Moreover, national-level processes addressing 
immediate needs make up only a small part of a complex eco-system of social, economic and 
political change that affect people’s lives in transitions (Tsai & Robins, 2018, p. 34). 
 
Discussing potential remedies with North Korean escapees in the context of interview and 
survey work is difficult due simply to an inherent lack of knowledge or experience with 
transitional justice mechanisms. While the questionnaire I administered found positive 
approval of the most commonly deployed transitional justice mechanisms, the idea of victim 
ownership over such mechanisms emerged in the interviews as more desirable in principle than 
in practice. Of the most common transitional justice mechanisms, truth-telling received the 
most positive responses, by a small margin (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Escapee perspectives on the importance of implementing common transitional 
justice mechanisms 
 
Mechanism Very important Quite important Not very important Not at all 
important 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. %  
Financial 
compensation for 
victims of human 
rights abuses 





241 75.8 72 22.6 4 1.3 1 0.3 318 
Perpetrators make 
official apologies 
244 76.9 64 20.2 4 1.3 5 1.6 317 
Non-judicial truth-
telling mechanism 




Regarding the prosecution of perpetrators, many participants stated that perpetrators of human 
rights abuses should be prosecuted in formal judicial settings, while non-punitive responses, 
such as giving amnesties and allowing perpetrators to reintegrate into society were much less 
popular options. Research by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights has also 
found a strong preference among North Koreans for prosecuting perpetrators through criminal 
justice processes (Lim & Kim, 2018, pp. 79–80). However, these options all remain 
hypothetical at present: no investigations into human rights crimes have been carried out from 
within North Korea, and much remains unknown about how or in what form a transition in 
North Korea may take place, not to mention whether former perpetrators may be involved as 
leaders within a transition, making their potential prosecution a contentious issue. Yet further 
research that begins with the varying needs arising from experiences of victimisation provides 
the potential to explore more meaningfully how possible remedies might best match these 
needs, for the long-term health of society. 
 
The most challenging question to discuss with North Korean escapees was the question of 
victims leading and designing a transitional justice process. Of those surveyed in the 
questionnaire, 97.4 per cent felt that it was important for victims to have an active leadership 
role on this front. However, during the in-depth interviews, participants expressed a number of 
concerns around how this might be achieved. While some felt that a transition in the form of 
inter-Korean unification, for example, would create an environment that would allow people 
to speak freely, others indicated a fear of what would happen to them or their families post-
unification/transition, should they be seen as traitors by those who remain in the North. Taking 
a leadership role was seen as making them potential targets of additional vilification. This 
connects with the questionnaire finding that over 84 per cent of the research participants 
expressed a fear of participating in human rights work focussed on North Korea, with the 
primary reason for this being concern for the safety of family members still in North Korea. 
Interviewees also expressed some uncertainly regarding North Korean victims’ groups leading 
the design and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms, linking this uncertainty to a 
perceived lack of neutrality: “The government should have final decision-making power. If the 
victims lead decisions, they could be biased because of their personal feelings”. This preference 
for looking to formal political leadership for decision-making power has emerged in other 
studies with North Korean escapees (Song & Denney, 2019, p. 459), and is another important 
factor for stakeholders to consider when conducting outreach with North Koreans. 
 
The insights described above merely touch on some of the questions that should inform the 
type of information sought from North Koreans on their country of origin, their experiences of 
abuses, as well as how their preferences might shape activities to better engage with and 
empower them as time goes by. Clearly, broader, more comprehensive investigation is needed 
in each of these areas, but even on the basis of the considerations and information just presented, 
a number of recommendations for ongoing NGO work are made in the final section of this 
article. 
 
Recommendations for civil society 
Having spent time working with NGOs in South Korea, I am aware that there are a number of 
structural challenges that must not be overlooked when it comes to extending or innovating 
beyond the current format and scope of work being done with North Korean escapees to support 
the accountability agenda. These are worth addressing first, in order to contextualise the 
recommendations that follow. 
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The North Korean human rights movement’s continuation of activities that privilege “top-
down” over “bottom-up” change, is significantly driven by the financial costs of change. The 
capacity to carry out new, long-term research and documentation projects is constrained by 
modest domestic funding and limited public interest. This in part because the South Korean 
government, regardless of its ideological orientation, has long taken a relatively cautious 
approach to North Korean human rights issues. Over the past two decades, governing power 
has swung back and forth between progressive governments who favour engagement with 
North Korea (which maintain relative silence on North Korean human rights issues), and 
conservative governments more critical on human rights but with typically poor relations with 
the North Korean leadership. Yet neither side has ever acted in a way that takes a strong stance 
on North Korean human rights. As I have discussed elsewhere (Son, 2018), reasons for this 
include a desire to keep inter-Korean unification aspirations alive as an important national goal, 
self-awareness of South Korea’s own struggles with human rights over much of its history, and 
the need to keep dialogue and cooperation with North Korea open at certain times. As South 
Korean government caution on North Korean human rights is likely connected to limited public 
knowledge of the problem, the lack of public interest-driven donations forces NGOs in this 
field to rely on limited-term, project-based funding, primarily from abroad. Such funding rarely 
provides for crucial capacity needs that would support significant innovation, such as sufficient 
provision for digital security expertise and infrastructure, or expert training for mangers, 
researchers and interviewers in new methods of human rights practice or organisational 
strategy. Nor are salaries sufficient to attract qualified experts in many of these fields. NGOs 
are thus not well-equipped to innovate and take advantage of new methods and technologies 
that might improve their efforts. 
 
This does not mean that there is no way to look into ways to pilot programmes, assess methods 
and implement strategies that can be actioned at the earliest stage of transition process. To do 
this, first, greater attention needs to be paid to breaking with established thinking on inter-
Korean unification and assumptions about what should happen in North Korea from an 
overwhelmingly elite-driven, South Korean perspective. Rather, resources should be invested 
in more rigorous research into the experiences of other contexts with transitional justice and its 
potential application to Korea. Localising existing transitional justice models demands an 
intimate understanding of the way those models have been adapted elsewhere. In the current 
situation, South Korean NGOs are best placed to do such work, particularly given the growing 
interest in the North Korean situation from scholars and transitional justice practitioners 
internationally, who carry much expertise of value. There is a particular need for more research 
which “challenges a vision of the transitional citizen as a passive recipient of new legal or 
political programs and points to the emergence of an alternative understanding of justice and 
democracy through public outreach programs” (Simic & Volcic, 2013, p. 4). How might NGOs 
begin preparing now for future national consultations in North Korea, of a kind which gets to 
the heart of local community and individual needs? Field-level engagement that looks at 
transitional justice among people than among countries and institutions is essential to its 
success (David, 2017, p. 153). Related to this, civil society and government bodies in South 
Korea would benefit from greater collaboration with social science research on North Korea 
that provides information on social, cultural, political and other structural dynamics that inform 
knowledge on the structures that shape violence, oppression, and victimhood, as well as the 
barriers and opportunities to addressing these things in the future. 
 
Second, there is a need to continually update research methodologies in human rights 
documentation on North Korea, particularly that undertaken by NGOs. This starts with basic 
items such as ensuring robust digital security infrastructure, to give North Korean research 
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participants a sense of assurance that the information they share is safe and unlikely to fall into 
the wrong hands, as occurred in December 2018 at a database at a Ministry of Unification-run 
resettlement centre in Gumi (Shin, 2018). It is important also that civil society think about how 
variations in the application of the data they collect demand innovation in approaches to data 
collection methodology. While some NGOs have experimented with focus-group, activity-
centred consultations with North Korean escapees, these are far from common practice, and 
the 1:1 interview, either in person or by phone, remains the prominent method of information-
gathering. As Song and Denney (2019) have shown in their focus-group work conducted with 
North Korean refugees in the United Kingdom, there is much that can be learned from 
exploring alternative means of consulting with, and understanding the perspectives and needs 
of the North Korean people who have left the country. There is a wealth of international 
expertise to tap into to advise on such matters, and NGOs would do well to consult widely on 
this front as they review their methodological processes. 
 
Third, and perhaps most crucially, there is the larger question of piloting new approaches to 
outreach, victim empowerment and planning and designing transitional justice mechanisms for 
implementation when the time is right. NGOs can play a key role in helping victims and 
communities gain knowledge on key issues and learn how to negotiate and compromise in 
these spaces (Tsai & Robins, 2018, p. 13). Although North Korean escapees have been cited 
by official voices in South Korea as the vanguard of inter-Korean unification for decades, as 
described above, outreach and training to support preparedness has been limited to activities 
such as unification camps for youth and counselling programmes. The substantive content of 
such activities is often situated in ethno-nationalistic discourse about the North–South filial 
relationship and the economic potential of a unified Korea, in a largely top-down, South Korea-
led vision of a future transition. By contrast, providing capacity and support for North Korean 
escapee-driven initiatives for thinking about the future can help connect needs arising from 
victimisation to the available remedies, thereby making it more likely that strategies respond 
to local challenges (Tsai & Robins, 2018, p. 9). 
 
Educational outreach can also include efforts to manage expectations about what can be 
achieved by mechanisms such as criminal justice proceedings, especially given the current 
advocacy focus on criminal accountability. Numerous studies have found that legal processes 
often set expectations among ordinary people unreasonably high, when in fact prosecutions of 
crimes against humanity “always prove evidentially difficult” and convictions are not always 
possible (Nickson & Braithwaite, 2014, p. 446). The Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean 
Human Rights has pioneered study trips for young North Korean escapees to Europe to view 
first-hand transitional justice processes in action, across a range of mechanisms from 
exhumations of victims’ graves, to the creation of archives. Programmes such as this could be 
expanded, empowering North Korean escapees to understand the scope of remedies that are 
possible, and more importantly, to see a potential role for themselves within such a process. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has made a case for exploring what it means to apply a victim-centred approach to 
ongoing documentation of human rights abuses in North Korea, and to planning for a future 
transitional justice process to deal with the legacy of atrocities. Through discussion of the 
literature around victim-centred transitional justice globally, it was possible to identify 
limitations in the current approach to working with victims of the North Korean regime, as well 
as in current research and methodologies viewed through a criminal justice-oriented lens. A 
thorough examination of current practice within both South Korean government-led and civil 
society work in the pursuit of accountability provided useful information on the state of practice 
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in the field. The presentation of selected research findings gathered from consultations with 
members of the North Korean escapee community in South Korea provided some initial 
reference points for reflection, situated in the broader scholarship on victims and possible 
modes of redress in a transitional justice context. The discussion emphasised the importance 
of parsing out where inconsistencies may lie between the actual interests and needs of victims 
and witnesses, and the needs currently being articulated by NGOs, the UN and concerned state 
governments. 
 
While there are significant challenges to fostering capacity and greater engagement of North 
Korean escapees in efforts to assess conditions and plan for the future, North Korean human 
rights-focussed NGOs can and should be exploring new modes of engagement now, to develop, 
test and, where appropriate, apply innovative modes of engagement and action, along with 
making policy recommendations to institutions with an existing agenda towards North Korea. 
NGOs can provide an important counterbalance to the traditional “institutional approach” 
which “necessarily restricts the interest of a transitional justice process to the minority of 
victims whose cases will be brought before some formal mechanism... remote from the 
communities they claim to serve” (Robins, 2017, p. 45). NGOs have a range of opportunities 
to advocate for or within a transitional justice process, even prior to its establishment, to 
mobilise self-representation for stakeholders, test new forms of organisation and create spaces 
where alternative mechanisms can be modelled (Gready & Robins, 2017, p. 960). Although 
the current situation on the Korean peninsula does not allow for the full expression of these 
options as in the context of a transitioning North (and South) Korea, there are certainly 
opportunities to begin testing and practicing adapted forms of the above modes of activity in 








In-depth interview participants 
 
Interviewee Gender Age Escape year from 
North Korea 
Arrival year in South 
Korea 
Occupation in North Korea 
1 M 60s 2015 2015 Office worker 
2 M 20s 2010 2010 None 
3 M 60s 2005 2006 Miner 
4 F 40s 2004 2013 Factory worker 
5 M 40s 1997 1998 Soldier 
6 F 50s 2010 2017 Postal worker 
7 F 40s 2009 2009 Party secretary 
8 F 60s 2000 2003 Community group leader 
9 F 80s 2006 2010 Elementary school teacher 
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